only subject to obligations that they create for themselves through treaty making. We compare this treaty making to the making of a contract. Since we use "treaties" in brackets immediately after contracts, we do not think that misunderstanding is likely to happen, but in light of the reviewers comments we have decided to replace "contracts" with "agreements" Page 22 -line 51: "train" is repeated twice
Now corrected
Page 23 -line 38: maybe the expression "against their state" is a bit too restrictive, unless it serves a specific intention on the part of the author. As he certainly knows, the Strasbourg court also examines cases brought by individuals against states different from the applicant's national state (not to mention cases brought by one state against another party to the convention) Thank you for this pertinent observation. There was no intention to use this restrictive language. Sentence now reads:
"Whereas the ECTHR adjudicates cases between states and individuals who claim that their human rights have been violated, the ICTY adjudicates criminal cases against individuals."
Two further general observations:
1. as to the law-making role of the Strasbourg Court, the author mentions LGBT rights, however the extensive and evolutive interpretation of the European Convention, according to its nature of "living instrument", can be referred to several other topics, as for example all bioethical sensitive issues which have gained prominence in recent years
We certainly agree with this, and LGBT rights is used only as an illustration of the dynamic that is introduced to the law in this area by the Court. We mention a few other examples on p. 13. To be clear we have now added a footnote where we introduce the issue of LGBT rights, which makes it clear that this serves as an illustration only, and that other illustrations could be found.
2. concerning legal reasoning and morality, I would like to highlight the existence of authoritative cases where international courts rely on a rather limited and politically oriented interpretation of custom and opinio juris. In so doing they declare what the law in force is without taking in the least consideration the relevant moral issues, or to say with the author without blending "moral assessment … into source-based argument" (page 3 -line 37). A recent example in point is the judgment delivered by the ICJ on 3 February 2012 in the dispute concerning the "Jurisdictional immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy)" where the Court reconstructed the scope of the customary rule on sovereign immunity in contrast with all moral considerations concerning the right of victims of war crimes to effective judicial protection and redress. This was indeed perceived as a bad decision which was the object of harsh criticism, since the Court was accused of having been too legalistic and mechanical in its assessment of international practice (as the author says at page 8 -line 42-44 This comment is quite general and not addressed at any specific part of the article. Furthermore the issue addressed in the comment is quite complex, and we agree with most observations. We would perhaps add that even though a court does not explicitly address the moral issues that are affected by a given decision by that court, it does not mean that the moral issue has not been made the object of consideration. Not every consideration that plays a part in the deliberation process finds its way to the formal decision that is being published by the court. Furthermore, we think there is a distinction to be made between the moral issues raised by the particular circumstances of the particular case on the one hand, and the moral issues raised by the institutional issues related to the Courts legitimacy and the processes of identifying the best interpretation of the relevant laws to be applied to the case. In the Germany vs. Italy example mentioned by the reviewer, what appears as a legalistic decision that shows no consideration for the moral importance of redress for victims of war, may well be the result of Gauging the implications of not respecting sovereign immunity in situations where redress relates to incidents that happened 70 years ago, and where The ECtHR had already ruled on the case (in favour of Germany) and finding those implication morally problematic in that it could potentially destabilize international relations if similar kinds of intrusion into sovereign immunity were allowed more generally. Hence what may appear as insensitivity to the rights of victims of war is really the result of a moral balancing of this right against the moral importance of not risking to destabilize international relations more generally. Thus while we appreciate the comment, we do not think that the article allows for further elaboration on this complex issue.
This dynamism 6 heralds a change in approach whereby ICs participate actively in developing the law. 7 These developments might also be explained in terms of a shift from static international law to a more organic process. Ideal-typically, static IL can be seen as comprising a thin background of jus cogens supplemented by treaties (bilateral and multilateral) fixing precise legal obligations between states, and expressed through a court system with one general court (ICJ) and perhaps several specialized courts with voluntary jurisdiction and ad hoc judges. Organic IL, however, although similarly characterized by a background of jus cogens, supplemented by treaties, now develops an added layer of case law that continuously interprets these treaty texts dynamically so as to reflect the underlying social, cultural and economic development, in the societies that are subject to the IL in question. Simultaneously, increased access to ICs by litigants other than states adds new forms of input to the decision making process. This development undoubtedly leads ICs to make decisions on issues that would not have arisen under a 'static' model. The tendency to increased juridification and legalisation noted above arises naturally from increasing resort to law as a means to both conflict resolution and conflict prevention. This straightforward relationship has, however, complex undercurrents, three of which should be noted here as a prelude to our more specific concern with contemporary approaches to judicial reasoning in International Criminal Law 8 . The first 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 concerns the organisational/ institutional arrangements relating to the social, economic and political conditions conducive to the emergence and continued existence and operation of International Courts. The second concerns the formal and specific legal mechanisms and strategies through which International Courts have developed the law and carved out their role and function in International Law and International Relations. A third aspect relates to questions of legitimation: How do International Courts create legitimacy? Through what social processes is legitimacy imputed to ICs? How do ICs handle crises in legitimacy or, as a daily concern, how do they avoid such crises? It is on this latter point that our thinking must become as dynamic and agile as contemporary International Law itself. For although it is sensible to regard legitimacy as a by-product of legality, it would, we suggest, be a mistake to assume that legitimacy only follows the static conception of international legality 9 . This latter conception, we argue, is often unreflectively reliant upon an under-theorised notion of 'source' as a basis for conceptions of legality that is now rapidly being superseded by the need of ICs to respond to ever more complex fact situations and an ever expanding corpus of relevant legal material (sources). The present situation for ICs -at least for the more specialised and prolific ones -is now such, we contend, that the decision making processes are so complex that moral assessment blend into source-based arguments. An understanding of how this blended reasoning operates will allow for a deeper insight into how ICs create and manage the legitimacy in their position as institutionalised operators of the International Law that falls under their jurisdiction. In what follows, we shall draw on both history and theory in an attempt to provide a clearer understanding of this phenomenon.
Judicialisation and Autonomy
A great deal of Legal Theory emphasises the autonomy of law to explain two key aspects of legal order as opposed to other forms of social normativity. One aspect is the distinctness of a legal rationality (i.e. an allegedly special type of justificatory reasoning); the other is its place in society as normatively dominant or supreme (by which theorists refer to the 'pre-4 emptive' and 'exclusionary' quality of legal norms). Some of the most influential Legal Theory construes in effect a conceptual strategy for comprehending these essential products of the autonomy of law.
10 More often than not this body of theory uses national constitutional orders (implicitly or explicitly) as primary reference points for its conceptual inquiries and focuses on the extent to which it is possible to identify what the law of a given jurisdiction is without resort to free-standing moral or political reason 11 . It is important that we attend to this strand of jurisprudential work, although the critical account of the significance of the autonomisation processes that we shall offer presently does not endorse the accepted conceptual separation of law from morality (or economy, or politics, or psychology). Instead, we propose a framework of ideas that will allow us to discern, articulate theoretically, and point empirically to the processes by which legal agents (in casu International Courts / judges) develop the law through adjudicative practices in such a way as to make the entire corpus of doctrine more case-law dependent. It is through this largely interpretive activity that international courts enhance their own role in the field of international law and governance 12 . The focus of the inquiry, then, will be to examine the way ICs administer their role in the field of international law and governance and to identify the matrix in which this administration takes place. Orthodox jurisprudential scholarship provides a useful point of departure for the inquiry. Gerald Postema presents the perhaps most detailed and comprehensive account of law's autonomy 13 Postema says that law defines a limited domain of practical reasons or norms for use by officials and citizens alike. Law cannot operate as a specialized and specified normative field without some form of delimitation between the legal and the non-legal. Law, in other words must be perceived as a delimited normative field, where the (pre-emptive and exclusionary) norms of law and the negative sanctions attached to them for non-compliance are valid only if they characteristically belong to the domain. One important way of delimiting the domain is codify and list the posited sources that define law's limited domain. This is reflected in the 'Sources Thesis'.
(ii) The Sources Thesis This thesis holds that normative membership in law's limited domain is determined by criteria which are defined exclusively in terms of non-evaluative matters of social fact (about their sources), such that the existence and content of member norms can be determined entirely without appeal to moral or evaluative argument. Legality is then clearly tied to positivity in that positivity is necessary to maintain the coherence of the limited domain thesis. In turn, the limited domain becomes simultaneously the referent of the legal and the means by which we distinguish the legal from the non-legal. But limiting the domain in terms of positivity in this way is not sufficient -one more element is required to assure autonomy in the analytical sense.
(iii) The Pre-Emption Thesis Rules in Law's limited domain operate as 'pre-emptive' and 'exclusionary' reasons for action. This is perhaps best understood by way of Raz's concept of the 'normal justification' of authority. That is, even where legal rules (and an account of obligation in respect of them) are superfluous in the sense that a reasonable person would act in accordance with them on their own common-sensical volitions, legal rules give practical reasons for action which pre-empt ordinary choices of action and which preclude other reasons for action. Thus, for example, choosing a convenient parking place is pre-empted by designated parking areas and restrictions, and reasons falling outside the domain (for example, parking on double yellow lines because you are in a hurry to get home to watch sport on TV) is excluded. In this way, rules within the limited domain are distinguished from norms outside of the domain -even when they coincide in content, purpose and practical rationale. These three interrelated theses express the core notion of legality -it's exclusionary character vis á vis other normative domains (morality, politics, religion, etc.) It remains clear however, that this artificial notion of autonomy cannot fully grasp the over-lapping normative complexity of any viable, modern socio-economic formation. Law's autonomy is only 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 relative and the Autonomy Thesis cannot explain legal practice in its totality. Postema, of course, is fully aware of this, and he points out that the AT needs to be embedded in an institutional context. This is because the norms that are identified by the 'sources thesis' … are authoritatively interpreted and applied, and the system of norms is maintained, by adjudicative institutions. Moreover adjudicative institutions are authorized to settle issues left unsettled by the set of source based legal norms available at any point in time.
Since, in such cases, by hypothesis, the existing legal considerations are silent, indeterminate, or in conflict, the Court' setting of them is determined not by appeal to the law, but by appeal to considerations outside its limited domain. [Emphasis added] 14 3. From the 'Limited Domain' to 'Transformative Dynamics' Legal norms are applied and interpreted by Courts and it is in this capacity that there is sometimes scope for Courts to operate outside the limited domain. The line between applying, interpreting, adjusting, modifying, adapting and altering the law is fine: effectively, social normativity is being re-coded (transformed) and dynamically (creatively, pragmatically) fashioned into legal normativity from material that exists -or might plausibly be purported to exist -both within and without the limited domain. It is in this 'Grey Zone' of the law, that the matrix of judicialisation is active. This matrix is the transformative and dynamic location wherein Courts map and re-code the 'Grey Zone' that is the normative area between the intra-legal and the extra-legal. To lay claim to this territory, Courts will promote argumentation frameworks that serve as platforms for converting Grey Zones into intra-legem zones. In so doing, Courts, in their case law, articulate legally what is sometimes referred to as judicial politics, i.e. they manufacture precedent in the Grey Zone. Effectively, through dynamic judicial activity, courts synthesize new law which can be absorbed by the pliable framework of doctrine and constituting principle behind the existing positive law. This process of dynamic judicialization -contrary to what, in theoretical retrospect should appear to us increasingly as the static logical ideal of a 'limited domain' -inevitably must involve political and moral choices. Alec Stone Sweet captures the character of this process in his article on the law's 'path dependence'. He says, I assume that judges seek to maximize, in addition to private interests, at least two corporate values … First, they work to enhance their legitimacy vis-à-vis all potential disputants by portraying their own rule-making as meaningfully constrained by, and reflecting the current 14 Postema, supra note 12, p. 93 .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 state of, the law. Second, they work to enhance the salience of judicial modes of reasoning vis-à-vis disputes that may arise in the future. Propagating argumentation frameworks allows them to pursue both interests simultaneously. Judges may also seek to enact their own policy preferences through their decisions. Yet the more they do so, the more likely judges will be to attempt to hide their policy behaviour in legal doctrine. Once policy is packaged as doctrine, it will operate as a constraint on future judicial law-making to the extent that doctrine narrows the range of arguments and justifications that are available to litigators and judges, and to the extent that the law is path dependent.
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There is, then, an intimate relationship between the precedentdriven development of law (the process of converting Grey Zones into established law) and the production of legitimacy. Portraying a legal decision as emerging from within "the law" as opposed to being policy led is more likely to produce the desired outcome in the form of clarifying the law and, insofar as this is seen as the operation of the expected and revered 'autonomy of law', it renders the decision more 'legitimate'. This does not mean, however, and as we shall explain presently, that we should hastily accept that the essence of legality, and thus of legitimacy is automatically to be located in this inner, doctrinal "packaging" as Stone Sweet has labelled it. In fact, if the decision is perceived as a 'bad' decision, Courts, as the juridico-political aspect of the wider social, economic and cultural process become the focus of criticism for being overly 'legalistic' and mechanical in their reasoning. This fact of life is simply a reminder that the 'autonomy of law' and the idea of a 'limited domain' are merely artificial orientations to the infinitely complex flux of competing normativities. For as Stone Sweet further points out: … courts may abandon precedent and start over; they may borrow doctrinal materials from other lines of case law considered more successful in some way; and the rule of incrementalism may be violated by dramatic new rulings. 16 So, whilst case law does produce more depth and complexity in legal doctrine by adding to and qualifying existing texts, and while cases may be closely interconnected through argumentation frameworks, case law remains relatively malleable. This is precisely the reason why 'Law's Empire' (to use Dworkin's familiar phrase) can continue to grow. But it is important to notice that this growth, even though it takes us outside 'the limited domain', is never wholly detached from the domain. On the contrary -there is a certain sense in which 8 Courts retain and protect the autonomy of the legal system during the exercise of their competence to interpret and apply the law to new cases.
The notion of autonomy as applied to international law and international organisations (including international courts) takes on an added dimension in that legal autonomy is not only a matter of separating the legal from the non-legal (the political and the moral) -in the context of international law, it becomes also a matter of separating the international from the national. This means that autonomy as applied to the jurisprudence of international courts becomes a rather complex notion, which might be quite difficult to contain. To give a sense of this, Collins and White provide in their introduction to an edited volume dedicated to the exploration of the meaning of institutional autonomy for international organisations 17 a sense of what autonomy in international institutions entails at its most basic level. In a commentary to the ICJs Reparations decision from 1949 18 , they write:
When the Court claimed that "fifty states, representing the vast majority of the members of the international community, had the capacity … to bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone …", it clearly recognized the impossibility of considering autonomy as merely a matter of the internal relations between institution and member states. The effect of bringing into being an organization such as the UN was that states had created an entity which was clearly more than the sum of its separate parts -having the ability, in other words, to exercise powers which no state could exercise in isolation." (Collins and White, 2011, p.2) An autonomous international organisation, then, is an institutional entity with its own will. In the case of International Courts, this will is expressed -of course -through the court's case law. There is then -despite the complexity -a structural similarity between IC autonomy vis a vis states and IC autonomy vis a vis other forms of normativity. It can be maintained therefore, as a general observation of ICs legal autonomy, that this autonomy entails that the legal system (which the Court is a part), and thereby the autonomy of those who perform the functions of this system, do so in a way that is not dictated by other sources of power and authority in (international) social life 19 . While ICs can receive input and derive inspiration from such other sources, its case law cannot be reduced to being a product of those other sources. ICs are autonomous because they operate a system of autonomous reasoning. Because of this autonomous reasoning it is not possible therefore to deduce computationally (as it were) answers to legal problems straight from the norms in the limited domain, and therefore one is forced to identify a form of reasoning which can operate outside the limited domain -yet not be seen as purely political or moral. If the law is autonomous, then it's must be able to define its own terms, and sanction the consequences that flow from describing the world in these terms. It must be able to identify and welcome solutions, trends, examples and analogies from its surrounding environment (society) and must be able to respond to these in ways that are considered relevant and legitimate. Yet it must do so in way that is alert to the inequitable influences and sectional interests of the power and status differences that permeate social life. This ideal of equitable neutrality is for the most part unattainable; yet the aspiration to autonomy is rightly operative as a functioning telos for the way courts operate. But rather than thinking about autonomy as an all-or-nothing attribute of a legal system, it would be more productive theoretically to focus on the degree to which a legal system or a court looks inwardly (to its own extant pronouncements) rather than outwardly when generating and developing argumentative frameworks. This perspective on judicial activity, in a different context, is what animates the American Legal Realist distinction between (a detached and ex post facto) 'formalism' and (a vibrant and responsive) judicial realism. Looking 'inwardly' here, means to attempt to construct answers to legal questions through the concepts that inhere in established canons of interpretation, and in doctrinal analysis, that seeks to establish commonalities and differences between various legal categories. In this 'involutional' doctrinal process judges over time, and by way of a series of cases, will attempt to refine the more precise content of legal categories. But it is not so much the judicial aspiration to present legal reasoning in line with the ideals of law's autonomy that will lead us astray here, but rather, the theoretical idolatry of the myth of static autonomous sources -in short, a naive belief that the Kingdom of the Limited Domain is a real place. This, essentially, is what Legal Realists past and present have rightly identified as a disingenuous (unrealistic) 'formalism' at work in the characterisation of law and the nature of adjudication. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 
Static and Organic Conceptions of Legality
Examples of the failure to develop more dynamic and organic understandings of legal processes and consequently a failure to develop more agile critical concepts are numerous, but the ICTY's analysis of what constitutes a 'belligerent reprisal' in Kupreškić, and Kuhli and Gunther's commentary upon it offer an apposite illustration of the general problem and a suitable platform from which to progress 21 . Before dealing with the specific issue in Kupreškić, it will be useful to illustrate the problem at hand with a more general example.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) adjudicates cases where there is suspicion that a perpetrator has committed a crime against humanity. In this illustration the crime is that of murder, and the elements of it are described as follows:
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(i) The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
(ii) The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. (iii) The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.
The ICC, in cases brought before the court, will seek to define more precisely what "part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population" means. Clearly, "part of" indicates a relationship between a particular perpetrator and a group of perpetrators in the sense of connection or coordination. "Widespread or systematic attack" indicates that 21 The following analysis should be seen as a contribution to the ongoing debate in ICL theory over the extent to which ICL can and/ or should emulate the strict legality requirements familiar to us in national law. Mark Drumbl and Mark Osiel suggest that IL should operate with legality criteria that focus more on the extent to which agents might reasonably expect impunity for their acts rather than on the formal requirement that only lex scripta suffice as a basis for punishing individuals 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 murders were somehow planned and premeditated. Similarly, "directed against" means that the attack must have had a more or less specific purpose or intention. And, "knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of" means that the perpetrator must have been aware of what conduct he or she was involved in.
Each of these issues could separately be made the object of a doctrinal legal inquiry in which the law would look (inwardly) to itself and its own doctrinal canons of construction. In that sense, the law and its judges are attempting to "work the law pure". This is not to say that political, ethical, religious, economic or other normative standards are neglected or ignored. The point is that these other standards become relevant only to the extent that they can be articulated legally. But, as noted, this form of relevant articulation (i.e. the legal) need not be anchored in the inflexible and inorganic understandings of the static era of International Law. On the contrary, just as with the European Court of Human Rights (ECTHR), the ICC's activities should be understood in the context of political support for more humanitarian forms of government.
The ECTHR has adopted a dynamic approach to Human Rights and developments in the case law of the Court must be seen against the background of a political will to strive for higher humanitarian standards in this regard. This entails recognition of the overall support for the court in using its competence to decide concrete matters as an instrument for this purpose. 23 Hence, the ECTHR has used its case law as an instrument to promote, for example, a ban on a specific form of physical punishment of children in public schools (Tyrer v. United Kingdom); action against prohibition of homosexual activity demands on national courts to assure that accused persons receive a fair trial in criminal proceedings (Hauschildt v. Denmark) and the protection of women's health in situations where abortion was prohibited but where the well-being of the mother was threatened by the pregnancy (Tysiac v. Poland). The emergence of the ICC and the ICTY; and ICTR should be seen in a similar light. That is, the adjudicative institutions of International Criminal Law must be seen as products of the overall political will to push for higher standards with respect to protection of civilian populations in war zones and more generally for promoting respect for the laws of war. This means that the ICTY cannot be understood simply and literally as an ad hoc Tribunal whose only purpose is to make decisions in those (random) cases that are brought before it. It is possessed of a wider judicial remit whereby standards of law in these 23 See for example Luzius Wildhaber, 'The European Court of Human Rights in Action ', Ritsumeikan Law Review, Vol. 21 2004. cases are made -and are expected to be made -more specific. Whilst we might say that ICL is still in its infancy (compared to e.g., International Human Rights Law or International Trade Law) there is a widespread consensus that the ICTY has been valuably effective in producing usable case-law in this respect. 24 It is perfectly understandable, therefore, that these organic achievements have led some commentators to suggest that the ICTY has, in some of its rulings, engaged not simply in adjudication and application, but in law-making. Orthodoxly, this can be seen as operating outside of and beyond the traditional domain and functions of Courts. Kuhli and Günther rightly suggest that lawmaking "implies the idea that courts create normative expectations beyond the individual case."
25 This observation makes a familiar distinction between discourses of 'norm justification' and discourses of 'norm application'. The former is a discourse that is usually assumed to be characteristic of legislatures, and concerns the issue of what norms should be issued; the latter concerns the issue of how a given rule should be interpreted and applied to a certain set of circumstances -usually seen as the business of the courts. This distinction however is difficult to maintain, it is superficially plausible in a situation where legislatures are operational and capable of engaging in continuous, majoritarian decision-making processes. No such legislature exists in the international normative-institutional space that occupies us here. Rather, and as we noted in our introductory remarks, the paradigmatic perspective up until recently has viewed International Law as a creation of agreements (treaties) between states, and the enforcement of these by the ICJ, has primarily been a matter of interpreting these agreements (treaties). The starting point, then, has not been the existence of a regulatory authority with the capacity to legislate for all, but rather the opposite: No Rights or Duties existed for any states other than by the express consent of the parties. There has, of course, always been a notion of customary law and/ or jus cogens, but the purpose of these rules has predominantly been to serve as instruments for solving conflicts by upholding the foundational principle that no state should be bound by any law other than by its own consent.
The historical starting point in International Law, therefore, is not the existence of a clear cut divide between legislator and judiciary. But, importantly, historiy shows that the same could In England, then, the 'Supreme Court' (Parliament) was initially involved in both application and justification. When economic and social relations reached a certain level of complexity this modus operandi became inadequate and parliament evolved into a purely legislative organ. There are many parallels between this state of affairs and the political situation we see in the contemporary international space. Although the political domain is functionally differentiated (broadly speaking between trade / economy; human rights/ fundamental rights, and Criminal Law/ Humanitarian Law) and although the international space is not completely devoid of legislative-like bodies (e.g., the UN, and various regional political corporations), it is accurate to say that courts are today operating on premises that resonate more with the functions of the 17th Century English Parliament, than, say, with a contemporary Danish (or German) High Court. In light of this, whilst the distinction between 'discourse of application' and 'discourse of justification' might be a useful heuristic, we should be cautious in our reception of it. It does, however, help us to articulate the extent to which 'judicial lawmaking' might be seen as the result of the collapse of our reliance on this convenient distinction. Kuhli and Günther's discussion Kupreškić is particularly revealing in this regard 27 .
26 Suri Ratnapala, 'John Locke's Doctrine of the Separation of Powers: A Re-evaluation', American Journal of Jurisprudence, no. 38, 1993. p.196 27 It should be noted that the Kupreškić decision on belligerent reprisals has been the object of much critique. Schlütter finds the Court's assessment of opinio juris "almost ironic" and she finds the Courts approach "radical" in that it is "more or less ignoring the relevant practice of states and orientating itself mostly towards the legal views of the ILC, the ICRC and the UNGA." (See p.235.) Schlütters abbreviations refer to: The International Law Commission, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations General Assembly). Similarly, Martins Paparinskis in The British Year Book of International Law 2008 describes the decision as "sweeping" and says that "its legal rationale is subject to some doubt" and that the arguments used in the decision are "initially suspect" -see p. 323 -325. Kuhli and Günther then, follow an already established line of critique that has been levelled against this decision. Whilst we are not primarily concerned to endorse or condemn the decision per se, we do wish to make the case for a methodological approach that can explain how it was possible for the ICTY to arrive at their conclusion. That is, to show how the judgment on belligerent reprisals (i.e. the arbitrary killing of innocent Despite what appears to be the identification of existing law on the matter, Kuhli and Günther suggest that the ICTY makes law in this case. They arrive at this conclusion by focusing on the argument developed in previous paragraphs of the decision.
Here the Tribunal speculates about whether or not the prohibition on belligerent reprisals that already exist in treaty law could be said to constitute a universal requirement (i.e. could be said to exist as customary law). Here is a passage from the decision:
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The question nevertheless arises as to whether these provisions, assuming that they were not declaratory of customary international law, have subsequently been transformed into general rules of international law. In other words, are those States which have not ratified the First Protocol (which include such countries as the U.S., France, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Pakistan and Turkey), nevertheless bound by general rules having the same purport as those two provisions? Admittedly, there does not seem to have emerged recently a body of State practice consistently supporting the proposition that one of civilians as an instrument of war) is not acceptable under customary international law. While we could have addressed the practice of the ICTY more generally, perhaps including more case law in our analysis, we have instead opted for an approach where the close discussion of one difficult case allows us to develop a more pointed analysis of the problems at hand. 28 Kupreškić, Trial Judgment p.207-208 .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 the elements of custom, namely usus or diuturnitas has taken shape. This is however an area where opinio iuris sive necessitatis may play a much greater role than usus, as a result of the aforementioned Martens Clause. In the light of the way States and courts have implemented it, this Clause clearly shows that principles of international humanitarian law may emerge through a customary process under the pressure of the demands of humanity or the dictates of public conscience, even where State practice is scant or inconsistent. The other element, in the form of opinio necessitatis, crystallising as a result of the imperatives of humanity or public conscience, may turn out to be the decisive element heralding the emergence of a general rule or principle of humanitarian law.
It might be considered superfluous for the ICTY to discuss the question of whether or not what is prohibited by applicable treaty law is also prohibited as international customary law. Why, we might ask, do the ICTY raise this question? The most obvious answer seems to be because the Secretary General of the UN in his original report, which contained the draft statute for the Tribunal stated:
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The application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions does not arise… It would seem, therefore, that the Court perceives its function and legitimacy as closely related to the possibility of clarifying what the status of customary law is. Kuhli and Günther, commenting on the above quote from the Kupreškić case find it striking that the Tribunal "… by expressly referring to those states, decided the customary law question with a view toward possible future cases (involving the United States, France etc.) over which the ICTY itself would almost certainly have no jurisdiction." 30 This, however, might be a misreading of the Tribunal's intentions. Raising the issue might be seen as a way of explaining the weight that is needed to advance the argument that the provisions in question are valid law despite not receiving explicit support from a number of important states in the international community. One could say that the court openly addresses the fact that these states may have their reasons for not wanting to endorse these provisions as part of international law. It would therefore require compelling and weighty argument brought to bear on the decision to regard these provisions as forming influential part of customary international law. 29 Quoted in Kuhli and Günther, supra note 23, p.369. 30 Ibid. p.376.
These influential reasons are laid out in the following part of the decision, and the ICTY is quite transparent in this regard: opinio juris is what must lift the weight of the argument. Congruously, then, we see the ICTY in the following paragraphs advert to the various documents that may serve as evidence of a universal or widespread opinion.
31 But the Court also puts forward a broader view of the matter. At para. 528-9 the Tribunal states that:
It cannot be denied that reprisals against civilians are inherently a barbarous means of seeking compliance with international law. The most blatant reason for the universal revulsion that usually accompanies reprisals is that they may not only be arbitrary but are also not directed specifically at the individual authors of the initial violation. Reprisals typically are taken in situations where the individuals personally responsible for the breach are either unknown or out of reach. These retaliatory measures are aimed instead at other more vulnerable individuals or groups. They are individuals or groups who may not even have any degree of solidarity with the presumed authors of the initial violation; they may share with them only the links of nationality and allegiance to the same rulers. 529. In addition, the reprisal killing of innocent persons, more or less chosen at random, without any requirement of guilt or any form of trial, can safely be characterized as a blatant infringement of the most fundamental principles of human rights. It is difficult to deny that a slow but profound transformation of humanitarian law under the pervasive influence of human rights has occurred. As a result belligerent reprisals against civilians and fundamental rights of human beings are absolutely inconsistent legal concepts.
Against this background of reasoning, Kuhli and Günther write:
It is striking to note the types of reasons that the ICTY is providing here. We hear practical arguments concerning the effectiveness of reprisals relative to the effectiveness of courts [see para 530 -we do not discuss this issue here]. We hear purely moral arguments concerning the inhumanity of attacking civilians and civilian objects. These are not the kinds of reasons that bear on the task of identifying existing international law. They are reasons taken from a discourse of norm justification. Effectively the ICTY is arguing that customary law in this instance should be created.
32
One could not find a more straightforward illustration of the fetishisation of a doctrinal distinction (between law 'as it is' and law as it 'ought to be'). In international law the distinction forces us desperately to invest qualities of permanence and pedigree in the notion of custom. Since Lauterpacht's exposition of progressive interpretation, however, this is a particularly brittle device, and one that has had tenuous purchase for many years. 33 In moving to a conclusion we will argue that this distinction cannot be drawn with any analytical clarity, and that rather than imposing a mechanical formula for discerning what is customary in international law, we should instead be prepared to engage with the normative implications that press upon us within what we can call 'the matrix of judicialisation'. By this is meant the historical, moral, organisational and political context of international courts at work. We may say, with Torben Spaak, that 'recognising' or' identifying the empirical 'raw material' of law does not automatically reveal the semantic potential of its normative scope. 34 The Kupreškić case is a profound example of the importance of this observation, but the point is more general in International Law and can be made in parallel to the ECTHR's case law on LGBT rights. Let us then briefly consider the scope of principle involved 35 .
Conclusion: Interpretation and Legality in International Law
In a recent study 36 , Larry Helfer and Eric Voeten have shown how LGBT rights have become increasingly articulated, widened, accepted and integrated in the development of the aims of the convention. The various legal issues involved are: Decriminalisation of consensual sexual activity in private; Equalisation of age of consent for homosexual activity; the right to serve openly in the Armed Services; Equal treatment of unmarried (and later married) same-sex couples with regard to various social rights; Rights associated with gender reassignment, Transsexual marriage rights, and Rights to gender reassignment. Whilst the case law shows a marked development in the recognition of these various rights, the convention texts in which these rights are based have remained the same.
33 See importantly P. Capps "Lauterpacht's Method" British Yearbook of International Law 2012. 34 Spaak says: "the identification of the legal raw material at the level of the sources of law is a purely factual matter, whereas the interpretation and application of this raw material often involves moral reasoning..." See Spaak, Torben "Legal Positivism and the Objectivity of Law." Annalisi e Diritto, Vol. 253, pp. 253-267, 2004. 35 The case law on LGBT rights is merely one of a number of examples that we could have used as illustration of our point. The extensive and evolving interpretation of the European Convention, according to its nature of "living instrument", can be referred to several other topics, as for example a number of bio-ethically sensitive issues which have gained prominence in recent years in ECtHR jurisprudence. 36 Laurence R. Helfer and Erik Voeten, 'International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe ' International Organization, vol. 67 (forthcoming 2013 )   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 We are talking particularly about the longstanding articles 8, 12 and 14; respectively: rights to privacy, rights to marry, and the right not to be discriminated against. The 'raw' sources of law have, then, remained the same for 50 years; yet the perception of what that law entails with regards to LGBT rights has evolved. Does this mean that ECTHR has developed new law? On one interpretation of what that question means, the answer would be an obvious 'Yes'. If, however, one takes as a starting point for legal interpretation that which was immediately apparent to the consciousness of the representatives that drafted the convention texts, then it would be plausible to suggest that the purpose of setting out a right to privacy, or a right not to be discriminated against, was not intended as an instrument that should be used to force member states to condone homosexual activity, or for them to formally re-register the sex of postoperative trans-sexuals. In fact, Art. 14 does not even list sexual orientation as one of the grounds that may give rise to a claim of equal treatment: sexual orientation has become accepted only as such through the general clause of "other status". When the convention was adopted few would have perceived homosexual or trans-sexual activities as envisaged by this kind of protection. On this view (i.e. some version of Scalia's "original intent" thesis), 37 t he ECTHR 'makes' new law in these instances.
On a less static view, however, the textual foundation of the law is so wide that the protection of these rights can easily be seen as covered by the relevant provisions. Organically speaking, the law is not (an immediate or unreflective) intention frozen in time, but rather, a textual expression of moral and social value arising in more or less specific circumstances from commitment to a more or less general normative principle. Standards of behaviour that cohere with this commitment may demand that previous understandings of the scope and application of legal rules are revised and developed over time and circumstance. The law, on this view, demands a commitment to the principled social values expressed textually, but not a commitment to a fixed historical version of what that text should mean. The consequence of this is that although the drafters did not have in mind, for example, homosexual activity when they drafted Articles 8 and 14, the value of respect for the principles underpinning privacy and equal treatment are seen as better served if one accepts that these activities do indeed fall within the ambit of the textual provisions.
In explaining how and why movement between on the on ehand, text (as 'raw material'), and, on the other, principle (as 37 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. (Princeton University Press, 1998) the semantic source of binding normative potential), can and must vary in magnitude, we need only consider the complexity of the matrix of judicialisation alluded to above. Some forms of legal regulation are, relatively speaking, semantically and normatively precise, that is, they have a more limited and focused semantic scope (regulation of pension age can be seen as an example of this). Others, as illustrated in Kupreškić and in our Human Rights examples, are more open. In both cases, the law operates as a form of adjustment mechanism, the function of which is to co-ordinate action in the public sphere. 38 If we imagine legal rules functioning in socially co-ordinatory and regulatory terms as bumpers or shock absorbers, legal texts that appear specific and detailed express a higher level of consensus and/ or a need for close co-ordination of action. Conversely, wider constructive interpretation responds to more expansive problems. One might imagine the two contrasting contexts of co-ordinatory action in terms of, on the one hand, and for example, the tightly constrained proximities of the individual wagons on a high speed train, as opposed, on the other, to the looser and more unpredictable relations between automobiles on roads and motorways. Co-ordination takes place in both cases, but where there is little room for manoeuver (as with the individual wagons of a high-speed train) shock absorption is short, sure, unilinear and homogeneous. Employing this metaphor, we can say that, when the ECTHR, for example, uses its interpretive discretion to say that LGBT rights are protected by the convention, they adapt to the more expansive coordinatory context that is available to them; that is, they become sensitive to the more diverse trajectories of more subtlely responsive, slower moving vehicles on wider roads and motorways. Precisely because there is such a scope for interpretive manoeuver, the ECTHR has a more onerous responsibility with regards to the co-ordinatory effect of its rulings. The Court itself is aware of this. In a decision from 2003 (Karner v. Austria), the Court says that, it "determine[es] issues on public-policy grounds in the common interest …", thereby signalling the aim of building public consensus in legitimising support for their interpretive strategies. This being said, there are obvious differences between the ICTY and the ECTHR. The ECTHR has a much longer history, has rendered more decisions, operates on the basis of treaty text, has a permanent existence, a much wider jurisdiction and so on. Yet there are also obvious similarities. Both Courts are international courts situated in Europe, both courts are assigned cases that relate to basic moral issues (i.e. human rights / humanitarian law), and both Courts were created as a response to war time atrocities. It is plausible to assume, therefore, that 38 See Postema, supra note 12 .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 some of the same mechanisms that one finds in the ECTHR's approach case law might also be common to the ICTY. One difference, however, should perhaps be singled out: Whereas the ECTHR adjudicates cases between states and individuals who claim that their rights have been violated, the ICTY adjudicates criminal cases against individuals. The ECTHR can pronounce that a state acts in contravention of the convention -the ICTY can send an accused individual to prison. This difference is important -and it stresses the important role in all ICTY case law of nullum crimen sine legem, a principle which is also set out in the ECHR, art 7. Insisting statically on the observance of this maxim threatens to return us to square one, but this need not be so.
What is it that gives a certain decision its legal character? Faced with this question the positivist's 'source thesis' stands out as particularly attractive: If normative membership in law's limited domain is determined by criteria which are defined exclusively in terms of non-evaluative matters of social fact, then it will be a morally-neutral endeavour to identify what the law is. Driven by a demand for positive identifiability it appears to be possible, by detaching the legal from issues of morality and politics, to make legal judgments on the basis of simple empirical facts. The rationale for this approach, paradoxically, suggests a moral advantage in serving the Rule of Law in that classically, this detachment equates to the liberal assurance that the state apparatus does not use its power arbitrarily.
39 But, as we have seen in our lengthy examination of the concept of law's autonomy, the problem is that methodologically, it is simply not possible to avoid an overlap between law and morality. Thus, whilst there are good reasons to distinguish between instances of law-making and law application, and while law-making can be entirely legitimate (as Kuhli and Günther concede), it might be worth considering whether the process of identifying what the law is involves value judgments of the kind Kuhli and Günther seem to dismiss.
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The legal matter before the court in Kupreškić asks if it is possible to identify sufficient support for a prohibition against belligerent reprisals in customary law. The ICTY recognised that there was not sufficient evidence in the form an existent and consistent state practice to support the view that belligerent reprisals are illegal. But they then argued that customary law might be identified through a study of the opinio juris of state agents. Whilst customary law usually requires that both the 39 For a good exposition, see H.L.A. Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals ' The Harvard Law Review, vol. 71, No. 4, 1958. pp.593-629. 40 See Kuhli and Günther. supra note 18, p.378 .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 conditions of usus and opinio be met, in this type of case (where usus is more a matter of refraining from engaging in certain activities) opinio plays a much greater role in establishing the foundation of law on the issue. To identify what the law is, therefore, it is necessary to undertake an inquiry into what relevant agents take the law to be. In so doing, one cannot rely on a criterion of absolute consensusone must allow, critically, for the possibility that some agents reason perversely. It is necessary, therefore, to operationalise criteria for sifting the central and correct conceptualisations of the legal duty from the peripheral and diluted understandingsand, in turn, these diluted understandings from the plain wrong understandings of the requirements of international law with regard, in this case, to belligerent reprisals. 41 To identify what the law is, one must, in other words, engage in an interpretive exercise to what both Lauterpacht and Dworkin see as 'Constructive Interpretation'. For Lauterpacht, this requires a construction of an image of what international law is for and what values it serves. In answering these meta-legal questions, law must stand up and be counted as to what, precisely, are its identifiable normative orientations. Customary authorities are not, then, to be seen as static empirical objects but rather, idealtypical reconstructions of existing practices viewed in the best possible light. They are judgments about what best appears to justify the overall enterprise of having a system of international rights and duties that impose limitations on the freedom of individuals and states. Hence, if a tribunal engages in normative discourse -as did the ICTY in Kupreškić case -one should not necessarily, as Kuhli and Günther suggest, perceive this as an instance of ad hoc law-making. Rather, this judicial activity is more accurately rendered as an attempt to serve the often unattainable ideals of law's autonomy by showing publicly and transparently how the court arrives at their conclusions about what the law is. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 
